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Dr. Giuseppe Ateniese
Giuseppe Ateniese is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Computer Science at the Johns Hopkins University (JHU). His research interests include network security, secure and reliable systems, applied cryptography and secure e-commerce. He received a M.Sc. in Computer Science from the University of Salerno (Italy) and a Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of Genoa (Italy) in February 2000. Before joining JHU, he was visiting scientist at the Information Sciences Institute (University of Southern California) and researcher (pre-doc) at the IBM Zurich Research Laboratory.
Translation in Cryptography: Signatures
We will describe recently-developed techniques that can be used to “translate” between digital signatures. Given a signature from Alice on a certain message, we will show how a proxy can convert it into a signature from Bob on the same message without knowing Alice's or Bob's secret keys. We will describe several applications of this cryptographic primitive, including: sharing of certificates, generating space-efficient proofs that a path was taken, transparent certification in ad-hoc networks, and online group signatures. We will also provide the basics of digital signatures and pairings-based cryptography. Based on a joint work with Susan Hohenberger (MIT).
Translation in Cryptography: Encryptions
We will describe recently-developed techniques that can be used to “translate” between ciphertexts. In particular, we will introduce new techniques that allow a proxy to convert ciphertexts intended for Alice into ciphertexts readable by Bob. The proxy does not know Alice's or Bob's secret keys and won't learn the encrypted message during the translation. We will describe several applications of this cryptographic primitive, including: defeating spam of encrypted data , enabling access control in file/storage systems, and digital rights management. We will also provide the basics of encryption, semantic security, and bilinear problems. Based on a joint work with Kevin Fu (MIT), Matt Green (JHU), Susan Hohenberger (MIT).
Employment & Education
Department of Computer Science, Johns Hopkins University
IBM Zurich Research Lab
Information Sciences Institute, University of Southern California
Dr. Mike Burmester joined the faculty at FSU as a Professor in 2001. Previously he was at Royal Holloway, London University. He got his bachelors from Athens University and his doctorate from Rome University. His current interests include privacy, network security, computer security and watermarking.
Towards Provable Security for Ubiquitous Applications
The emergence of smart environments where computing devices are embedded pervasively in the physical world has made possible many interesting applications and has triggered several new research areas. Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANET), sensor networks and radio frequency identification (RFID) systems are all examples of such pervasive systems. Operating on an open medium and lacking a fixed infrastructure, these systems suffer from critical security vulnerabilities for which few satisfactory current solutions exist, particularly with respect to availability and denial of service. In addition, most of the extant knowledge in network security and cryptography cannot be readily transferred to the newer settings which involve weaker devices and less structured networks.
We shall investigate the security of pervasive systems with focus on availability issues in the presence of a powerful adversary that can control some nodes and eavesdrop, re-route, modify, delay, and insert messages on all communication channels. We will articulate a formal security framework that is tuned for the analysis of protocols for constrained systems and show how this can be used with applications that involve MANET and RFID systems. In our approach we use optimistic protocols for which the overhead is minimal when the adversary is passive. When the adversary is active, depending on the application, the additional cost is either used to trace malicious behavior or born by non-constrained components of the system. Our goal is to design mechanisms that support self-healing and that promote a fault-free system state, or a stable system state, in the presence of a Byzantine adversary.
Dr. Davis is the Interim Director of the Office of Academic Information Techologies and an Associate Professor in Electrical and Computer Engineering. He has been with E CPE since 1984, right after receiving his Ph.D. in Computer Science from Iowa State University. His research and primary teaching responsibilities are in the area of computer network and system security. He served as Associate Chair for two years and as Interim Department Chair in Spring 2003.
Legal & Ethical Issues
We will analyze the legal and ethical issues surrounding information security, including the questions raised by heightened connectivity and the legal implications of free data transmission.
Employment & Education
Office of Academic Information Techologoies, Iowa State University
Dr. Kranakis received a B.Sc. (in Mathematics) from the University of Athens in 1973 and a Ph.D. (in Mathematical Logic) from the University of Minnesota, USA, in 1980. From 1980 to 1982 he was at the Mathematics Department of Purdue University, USA, from 1982 to 1983 at the mathematisches institut of the University of Heidelberg, Germany, from 1983 to 1985 at the Computer Science Department of Yale University, USA, from August to December of 1985 at the Computer Science Department of the Universiteit van Amsterdam, and from 1986 to 1991 at the Centrum voor Wiskunde en Informatica (CWI) in Amsterdam, The Netherlands. He joined the faculty of the School of Computer Science of Carleton University in the Fall of 1991.
He has published in the analysis of algorithms, bioinformatics, communication and data (ad hoc and wireless) networks, computational and combinatorial geometry, distributed computing, and network security. He is the author of Primality and Cryptography (Wiley-Teubner series in Computer Science, 1986), and co-author of Boolean Functions and Computation Models with Peter Clote (Springer Verlag Texts in Theoretical Computer Science, 2002).
He was director of the School of Computer Science from 1994 to 2000 and received the Carleton Research Achievement award. He was IT (Information Technology) Theme Leader from 1998 to 2004, and currently he is CNS (Communication, Networks, and Security) Theme Leader in the MITACS (Mathematics of Information Technology and Complex Systems) NCE (Networks of Centers of Excellence).
Enhancing Intrusion Detection in Future Wireless Systems
Wireless systems are increasingly being used for important communication and it is a challenge to keep electronic data transmissions secure. In this talk we will discuss Challenges, Risks and Threats in Wireless Systems and how to enhance future Wireless IDS using Radio Frequency Fingerprinting and Mobility Profiles.
Worms and Viruses of the Internet
In this talk we will survey how viruses and worms propagate in a network. We will discuss: Malicious Logic, Worm Attacks and the Internet, Classification of Worms, How to be More Effective, Population Models and Dynamics of Worm Propagation, Best Effort Models, Zero Time Models, and Search Models.
Employment & Education
School of Computer Science, Carleton University
Centrum voor Wiskunde en Informatica (CWI), Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Computer Science Department, Universiteit van Amsterdam
Computer Science Department, Yale University
Mathematisches Institut, University of Heidelberg, Germany
Dr. Medeiros joined the faculty of the Computer Science Department at Florida State University after completing a Ph.D. degree in Computer Science from The Johns Hopkins University (2004). His published research includes works on privacy-preserving protocols for medical transactions, group signatures schemes, identity-based cryptographic primitives with applications to e-auctions, and on distributed certified e-mail. Some of his current research interests are in the areas of public key cryptography, secret sharing schemes, and privacy-enhanced protocols and services.
Strong Security for Feeble Devices
(or “New Anonymous RFID Authentication Protocols with Provable Security”)
Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFIDs) were initially developed as very small electronic hardware components having as their main function to broadcast a unique identifying number upon request. The simplest types of RFIDs are passive tags, that do not contain a power source, and are incapable of autonomous activity. These devices are powered by the readerís radio waves, and the antenna doubles as a source of inductive power. The low cost and high convenience value of RFIDs give them a potential for massive deployment, and it is expected that they will soon outnumber all other computing device types. Consequently, RFIDs are increasingly used in applications that interface with information security functions.
This talk describes simple, anonymous RFID identification protocols. By making specific setup, communication, and concurrency assumptions that are realistic in the RFID application setting, we arrive at a model that guarantees strong security and availability properties, while still permitting the design of practical RFID protocols.